I. INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW
The unfolding events of the "Jasmine Revolution" in North Africa during the so called "Arab Spring" 1 of 2011 challenged and even changed the political landscape in the Maghreb, the Arab and the Mid-Eastern world. While some of the protests led, with the deposition of Zine al-Abedine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, to actual regime change and a move towards freedom and democracy, other states in the regions have been less fortunate and saw a backlash of the "old order" of autocratic governments as witnessed in the cases of Bahrain and Syria. In late October 2011, the conflict in Libya had come to an end with its leader (de facto president) Muammar al-Gaddafi (who officially held no public office in Libyan Jamahiriya) killed and a new transitional government, the National Transitional Council [NTC] , in power. This was the outcome of a seven month conflict with sixth months of intensive close air support by NATO air power, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011 2 : the future will tell how successful in terms of democratisation and self-determination the de facto "regime change" in Libya will turn out to be. The prolonged and costly military engagement in Libya highlighted how quickly NATO and the European Union could be drawn into military combat operations, unofficially referred to as "kinetic operations", when asked or compelled to contribute militarily to peace and security stabilization operations in the region in order to stop the commission of widespread human rights violations (as evidenced in Libya).
This foreign, mostly western, military response to a developing "humanitarian crisis" on the ground constitutes one of the most recent examples of the use of military force in the wider context of war -albeit authorized by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII United Nations Charter -involving NATO assets in this century. At the beginning of the previous decade, it was "9/11" (as the attacks on 11 September 2001 3 on the United States of America were called), which led to the present so-called "war on terror", which so far has seen two military campaigns 4 of doubtful legality 5 under international law:
"Operation Enduring Freedom" in 2001 6 was followed by "Operation Iraqi
Freedom" in 2003. 7 The legality of both campaigns, including the invasion and subsequent "regime-change" in the case of Iraq by the US-led coalition, will be subjected to legal debate for years to come. 8 Despite this, and on-going inquiries (such as the UK Iraq inquiry) 9 , it seems rather unlikely that there will be any (international) criminal law action for the crime of aggression taken against any individual leader for having planned and/or ordered the invasion of Iraq. This omission has to be seen against the backdrop of the Nuremberg trials of 1945 and their continuing legacy as enshrined in the Nuremberg Principles of 1950. While this legacy informed various domestic and international prosecutions of crimes under international law such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, the crime of aggression basically became a very contentious debating point, but with no prosecutions for this crime during the decades following the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The (legal) dynamics changed somewhat with the adoption of the Resolution on Aggression at the Kampala Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 2010.
This article asks the question whether "9/11" and the subsequent "war on terror" has changed our perception of the overall legacy of the Nuremberg trials in 3 Referring to the infamous attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, executed by mostly Saudi-born terrorists of the Al-Qaeda network, which took place on 11-09-2001, in which some 3000 people lost their lives. C.f. Dominic McGoldrick, From "9-11" to the Iraq War 2003: International Law in an age of complexity (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 9-11; also referred to as 9/11 attacks. respect to the crime against peace as enshrined in Article 6 (a) of the Nuremberg Charter, which has become a substantial part of the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (now provided for in Article 8bis adopted at the Kampala Review Conference and which will enter into force at the earliest in 2017). New, modern threats to global peace and security stemming from so called "Hybrid Threats", 10 such as cyber war, low intensity asymmetric conflict scenarios, global terrorism, organized crime and piracy affect and involve a diverse and broad community of stakeholders at both the regional and international level and also pose further questions for the legacy of Nuremberg. The (perhaps unsettling) question arises of whether our present concept of "war and peace" with its legal pillars of the United Nations Charter's Articles 2(4), 51, and an underdeveloped notion of the criminality of waging aggressive war, based on the "legacy" of Nuremberg, has not become outdated to respond to new threats arising in the 21 st century. Our question is furthermore based on the assumption that new powerful (non-Western) role-players will have their own imprint on the development of what might become the 21 st century jus contra bellum: a sceptical view of the use of armed force to further universalist or liberal goals and ideas such as "humanitarian intervention" (or more bluntly, regime change posing as human rights intervention), or indeed expansive notions of self-defence under the rubric of the "war on terror". The idea here is germinal indeed, but a necessary preliminary in order to proceed with the basic criticism of the Nuremberg legacy as essentially inadequate in terms of the new threats to peace and security.
This article 11 consists of three parts: firstly, it summarizes briefly the major arguments and criticism which were originally directed at the legality of the crime against peace under Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter and the subsequent principles VI and VII of the Nuremberg Principles 12 as the legal precursors to the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute. It is not the intention of the authors to question at length the legality or even morality of the Nuremberg trials as such but to discuss the legacy of the Nuremberg trials and their impact on the development of the (new) law of aggression post World War II. Secondly, a summary of the 10 NATO describes these Hybrid Threats as those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives -NATO has identified these threats and established a concept framework, the so called Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats [MCCHT] which aims at identifying a wider comprehensive multi-stakeholder response, see BI-SC Input for a New NATO Capstone Concept for The Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Enclosure 1 to1500/CPP-CAM/FCR/10270038 and 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated 25 August 2010). For general information on the NATO CHT experiments see online: NATO <http://www.act.nato.int/top-headlines/nato-countering-the-hybrid-threat>. The author took part in this experiment in 2011 as NATO Rule of Law subject matter expert [SME].
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The authors have undertaken some prior work in that field. based on the assumption that the law of Nuremberg possibly violated the legality principle and non-retroactivity doctrine in criminal law often described in terms of the maxims nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege. 26 Other causes of criticism were related issues such as the "ex post facto" nature of the Nuremberg Charter's codification, the use of legal analogies and the existence of legal ambiguities (which will not be discussed in this article). Nuremberg was the product of a political-legal approach, taken by the Allied victors in World War II to end criminal impunity of waging aggressive war based on the sobering observation that there was "no general prohibition in international law against the waging of war."
27 Reisman (with reference to the post-war responses) describes the interdependence of the illegality of using aggressive war and the need for criminal sanctions of such actions:
The first was a political response to aggression: the United Nations Charter prohibited "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state" and authorized the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security." The second was a criminal justice response to aggression: the victors established international tribunals for finding "individual responsibility" for "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression."
28
The law of Nuremberg constituted law which had been imposed on the defeated enemy state of Germany. Consequently, the question had to be asked whether the four victor powers had the necessary legitimacy to enact the Nuremberg Charter as new law. The following arguments sum up the view that the creation of the Nuremberg Charter did not violate international law, or was, at least, justifiable:
1. The assumption of the unlimited legislative, judicial and administrative jurisdiction over the German territory and its people by the allied control council after the factual "debellatio" of Germany through the four victorious powers, made the absence of an international treaty with Germany under the prevailing circumstances, acceptable to the international community. 2. The IMT had jurisdiction ratione personae over individuals only and not over Germany as a state. The subjecting of individuals to a foreign jurisdiction did not require the consent of Germany as the state of origin of these individuals.
30
Contemporary practice of establishing international criminal tribunals to prosecute individual perpetrators of international crimes resembles not only a lawful means for the United Nations Security Council's powers to respond directly to a threat to the peace as stipulated in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations 31 but even a duty in terms of the duty to protect civilians 32 from the commission of the core crimes. 33 This practice follows directly the Nuremberg precedent of creating a tribunal to adjudicate crimes under international law. Such actions are freed from the necessity to obtain prior consent of the states affected. 34 The jurisdiction of these ad hoc international tribunals derives directly from Security Council resolutions and/or multilateral treaties.
The establishment of the international criminal tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda were such United Nations Chapter VII actions of the Security Council. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established as the result of genuine cooperation 35 between the United Nations and a specific state in prosecuting human rights violations before an international hybrid forum. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998 requires in general voluntary accession as a precondition for the exercise of its jurisdiction and allows only one "coerced" option for the exercise of jurisdiction as stipulated by Article 13 (b) of its Statute.
36
The law of Nuremberg resembled new, "retroactive", law in the sense that it was codified after the commission of the crimes in question for the purpose of holding the German military and political leaders ex post facto criminally 30 See Wright, supra note 25 at 46 with reference to case law on the judicial competence of courts and state sovereignty.
31
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations of June 26, 1945 , 59 Stat. 1031 Bevans 1153, entered into force Oct. 24, 1945, provides for measures in the connection to "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression". accountable, as explicitly stated in Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter. 37 The ex post facto nature of the law of Nuremberg would constitute a violation of international law in the absence of applicable exceptions. The law of Nuremberg itself could provide such an exception because as Kelsen points out that "the application of unknown law is not without exceptions. The rule is effective only with respect to legislation, not against the creation of law by custom or judicial decisions".
38 Given this, the question arises whether such an exception could have been found in the existence of custom(s) criminalizing certain acts at the time of their commission by the accused. If that was the case, the fact that the law of Nuremberg had been new and retroactive law would not constitute a violation of international law thanks to the existence of such a customary law exception.
C. The legality of the retroactive crime against peace -selective justice or international criminal justice in progression?
Acts of "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements..." which would today qualify as the crime of aggression (under Article 8bis of the Rome Statute of the ICC which is not in operation yet) were criminalised as so called "crimes against peace" under Article 6(a) Nuremberg Charter.
39
Examples of such crimes against peace were the German attack on Poland in September 1939 or the attack on "neutral" Denmark in 1940. 40 This crime constituted a "leadership" crime and was used to prosecute members of the German military high command 41 as well as the political leadership which had been involved in the decision-making processes before and during the war.
Such crimes against peace were criminalized for the first time in the Nuremberg Charter: prior hereto and until the outbreak of World War I, the "right" of a state to resort to war, the jus ad bellum, was most widely regarded only as "a mere continuation of Whether the Franco-British declaration of war on Germany of 3 September 1939 as a consequence of the German attack on Poland falls within the wider category of a crime against peace is debatable, the same question arises in the context of the Soviet attack on Poland in the second half of September 1939 as part of the Soviet German Molotov -Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, the Soviet aggression in 1939 and finally the failed Anglo-British landings in (then neutral) Norway, the latter action which would today fall under today's terminology of "preemptive" self-defence.
41
The OKW, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the High Command of the then German defence force. Some early attempts to criminalize war can be seen in the 1923 Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance of the League of Nations and the (non ratified) League of Nations' Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, the so called "Geneva Protocol", of 1924. Article 1 of the Assistance Treaty states "that aggressive war is an international crime," and that the parties would "undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission."
49 The Geneva Protocol provided that "a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and is an international crime."
50
In the absence of binding criminal law principles, the acts of planning, preparing and finally waging war against Poland in 1939 would not have qualified as crimes under international law but nevertheless as collusion in acts leading to breaches of international law resulting in inter-state (tort) responsibility with reparations for the offending state, as witnessed in the seminal Chorzow Factory 43 Moghalu, supra note 25 at 22. Other attempts to try him for war crimes were also futile and the German Emperor was, eventually to die in Dutch exile in 1941. 
45
Covenant of the League of Nations, articles 11 and 16 respectively -the League's sanctions against Mussolini's Fascist Italy in the mid-thirties for its war of aggression in Abyssinia was the only more notable peace enforcement action by the League and directly led to the advent of the German-Italian detente and eventual coalition. 51 This view is supported in the findings of the sub-committee of the legal committee of the United Nations War Crimes Commission [UNWCC] in its majority report of 1945 whereby "acts committed by individuals merely for the purpose of preparing and launching aggressive war, are lege lata, not "war crimes".
52
The decision to establish criminal accountability before the IMT in the end followed the overall consensus, whereas, acts of crimes against peace "are of such gravity that they should be made the subject of a formal condemnation in the peace treaties. It is desirable that for the future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages (...)"
53
This view was confirmed in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 95 (I) in 1946. 54 As explained above, the law of Nuremberg regarded these offences as crimes under existing (customary) international law principles and not just as nonpunishable violations of international law. The IMT based this view on basically two arguments: firstly that the Nuremberg Charter constituted the expression and manifestation of international law in existence at the time of its creation and as such contributed directly to the formation of (new) international law; 55 and, secondly, that punishment for crimes which were not punishable/prosecutable at the time of their commission should be allowed if the absence of punishment would otherwise appear to be "unjust": 56 To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and assurances have attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished 57 Following the above-mentioned UNWCC majority report and the comments by Kelsen 58 it has to be concluded that at the time of the commission of the respective acts, individual criminal responsibility for the act of resorting to the use of force could not have been legally established under international law: firstly because of a lack of precise multilateral criminal provisions, secondly a respective customary law provision did not exist at the time of their commission and thirdly because of the non-retroactivity principle as a non- and whose derogation was not covered by one of the exceptions discussed above by Kelsen.
The fact alone that the IMT, as a legal predecessor to the current international tribunals, was forced on defeated Germany with obvious disregard and indifference to her sovereignty and jurisdiction had to lead eventually to questions re: its legality and overall impact. Following the rationale of Kelsen, this legality "deficit" in respect to the crime against peace continues to exist unless and until subsequent universal acceptance and actual usage of proceedings and findings of the IMT in the form of the Nuremberg principles 59 as part of customary international law 60 occur, thus legitimizing the law of Nuremberg under international law as part of customary international law. Custom requires both usus and opinio juris; state practice and a corresponding view among states.
The law lords of the (former) House of Lords (the new Supreme Court) took the view in their judgment in R v Jones (2006) 61 that individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression could be based on customary international law developed since the coming into force of the Nuremberg Charter in 1945, notwithstanding the absence of any international codification of the crime of aggression (that is prior to the Kampala Review Conference, discussed below). Authors and commentators generally agree with this characterization of aggression as a crime under customary international law, albeit with a narrow and not expansive scope.
62
The legacy of Nuremberg and the failure/reluctance to make observance of the Nuremberg Principles the mandatory yardstick of our foreign and security policy continue to affect modern day attempts to effectively criminalise aggressioneven though the adoption of the definition at Kampala represents some progress. The question is whether a revision of Nuremberg's legacy has already started? We submit that the very inclusion of the crime against peace within the structure of the crime of aggression for purposes of the ICC necessitates such a revision -not for the sake of revision, but for the sake of future legal certainty.
III. AGGRESSION UNDER THE ICC STATUTE POST KAMPALA
In spite of the controversy surrounding the legality of the Nuremberg trial, the legal and judicial precedents set by the law of Nuremberg and its trials did mark the "start of international criminal law stricto sensu" 63 which at least in theory applied to former victors and defeated alike: "while this law is first applied against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn, aggression by any other nations, including those who sit now in 
judgment"
64 Some argue that the crime of aggression "was very much at the heart of" this historic moment. 65 The unfinished business of adopting a definition of aggression for purposes of the Rome Statute (and ICC jurisdiction) therefore remained an ironic reminder of the progress, but also the difficulties, of international criminal law. The eventual adoption of a resolution on the crime of aggression at the Kampala Review Conference on the Rome Statute can be seen as an important confirmation and affirmation of the process that really started at Nuremberg. In historical terms, the Nuremberg to Kampala narrative should rightly be seen as one of the great epochs of international criminal law-making. But, as always, the devil is in the detail.
The definition of aggression (Article 8bis) and conditions for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction (Articles 15bis and 15ter) 66 were adopted at Kampala in June 2010. 67 The adoption was preceded by a lengthy drafting process (conducted by a Special Working Group), which resulted in a report which was in turn adopted by the Assembly of States Parties in November 2009. 68 The quality of the preKampala work was such that the Working Group report (as adopted by the Assembly of States Parties) was eventually adopted by the Review Conference at Kampala. 69 The definition of aggression to be included in the Rome Statute reads as follows:
Article 8bis Crime of aggression 1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime of aggression" means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.
The above definition will not be analysed in detail here. For purposes of this contribution a number of relevant features will be discussed. In particular, the implications of the definition of aggression for the "post-9/11" world, as well as for possible responses to new Hybrid Threats to international peace and security will be pointed out. It is clear from the text that the Kampala definition constitutes a marriage between Nuremberg and the 1974 General Assembly definition of aggression, with some modifications. Aggression under article 8bis is now a leadership crime par excellence. 70 The language seems to suggest a stricter approach than the Nuremberg process, where individual liability was framed with reference to individuals who could "shape or influence policy". "Effective control" (Article 8bis (1)) could limit individual liability to the exclusion of individuals who, for instance, merely influenced policy. 71 This view of "leadership", combined with the state-centric approach to the crime of aggression, underscores the difficulty in 70 Art 8bis (1) read with art 25 (3bis); see analysis by Kemp supra note 62 at 236-237; Ambos, ibid at 468. 71 Ambos, supra note 69 at 490. For a more nuanced view on "leadership", see Kemp, supra note 62 at 236-237. extending the crime of aggression to "post-bureaucratic forms of organization as represented, for example, by paramilitary or terrorist non-State actors." 72 An important aspect of Article 8bis, paragraph 1 is the threshold qualification. The act that constitutes the "crime of aggression" must constitute by its character, gravity and scale a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. However, as pointed out by commentators, 73 the individual conduct required in terms of the Kampala definition is more in line with the Nuremberg and Tokyo precedents, namely planning, preparation and initiation or execution. The qualitative aspect of Article 8bis (1) links the state act with the normative protection of the United Nations Charter against manifest violations, thus excluding minor incidents of violations of state sovereignty or "legally controversial cases" like humanitarian intervention from the ambit of the crime of aggression 74 (for ICC purposes). But this qualitative aspect can be criticised as vague, perhaps too vague for purposes of criminalisation. 75 However we agree with Ambos's view, that "the lack of precision is embedded in the primary norm regulating the use of force." Thus, "if it is not possible to clearly delimitate lawful from unlawful uses of force, how could the lines be drawn any more clearly at the level of the secondary norm criminalizing the unlawful use of force" 76 (per Article 8bis)?
The criminalization (under Article 8bis (1)) of the unlawful use of force is structurally linked to the use of force by a State, and this state-centric approach is underlined by the inclusion in Article 8bis (2) of reference to General Assembly Resolution 3314 on Aggression. Whilst broad support was given during the preKampala processes to the inclusion of Resolution 3314 in the definition of aggression, 77 the eventual inclusion only confirms the pragmatic inclination of the negotiators and still does not "capture modern forms of aggression carried out by non-State actors in asymmetric conflicts". 78 The roots of this can arguably be traced to the debate about the scope of the 1974 Definition of Aggression itself. The recently independent states, members of the so-called Non-Alignment Movement [NUM] , and the Soviet Union with its client-states, took the view that wars of national liberation were exceptions to UN Charter's Article 2(4) prohibition of the use of force. The 1974 Definition thus incorporated the idea that people(s) can (and should legally be able to) struggle for self-determination -and 72 Ambos, supra note 69 at 492.
73
Ibid at 468.
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Ibid at 482-483; Kemp, supra note 62 at 234 where the author argues that the criminalization of aggression for ICC purposes should "as closely as possible keep to the historical roots of the crime under international law -that is the criminalization of the jus contra bellum, and not mere (relatively) trivial international incidents or violations of international law." Of course, the content of the jus contra bellum is not static, as is shown in this contribution. This apparent political approach (which was not so much concerned about the fact that the 1974 Definition was not drafted with individual criminal liability in mind) was ultimately rejected. 80 The Kampala resolution on the definition of aggression thus reflects a more traditional state-centred approach to acts of aggression, without any explicit reference to exceptions for national liberation struggles and wars of national liberation.
Apart from the question about possible acts of aggression committed by nonstate actors, referred to above, a related future issue (in the context of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression) could be the question of acceptance of ICC jurisdiction by non-state actors and entities, such as national liberation movements or indeed non-states such as Palestine (on the assumption that this entity does not become a state and full member of the UN in the near future). The question of Palestinian statehood is a complex and ever evolving one, 81 and not the focus of this contribution. However, against the background of that debate, it is ?" in Stefan Burgdörfer, ed, International Reports, 8/11 (Berlin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011) 51. submitted that the state-centred jurisdictional regime of Article 12 of the Rome Statute of the ICC precludes ICC jurisdiction over situations where a non-state entity would on an ad hoc basis accept ICC jurisdiction -even where such an entity (for instance a national liberation movement or even an entity in statu nascendi) would be in de facto control of a certain territory. We agree with the sensible conclusion of Yaël Ronen:
Interpreting Article 12(3) more widely to include entities effectively governing non-sovereign territory also seems unwarranted, as such interpretation flies in the face of the ICC Statute's wording and the intention of its drafters. Any involvement in issues of recognition risks exposing the Prosecutor and the Court to accusations of politicization and subjectivity.
82
If individual criminal liability for aggression is the aim of Article 8bis (as indeed it is), then we agree, in principle, with Ambos that essentially the crime of aggression "is not so much determined by the actor but by the wrongfulness of the act. 83 Of course that brings us back to the fundamental debate about the content of the jus ad bellum, and the meaning of wrongfulness, the questions at the heart of this contribution. Article 8bis (2) is clearly not aimed at non-state acts of aggression. It is also not wise or permissible under criminal law doctrine to extend the list by way of analogy.
84 Is the answer perhaps to first tackle the first normthe prohibition of the use of force -and then get back to the secondary norm -the criminalization of the unlawful use of force? That would be in line with the approach first taken at Nuremberg (albeit controversially as pointed out above) and later essentially repeated at Kampala, although this time on sound legal and political ground.
So what are these future challenges and how would they impact on our understanding of the modern "crime against peace"; the crime of aggression?
IV. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ON FUTURE MILITARY CHALLENGES AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPACT ON THE NOTION OF THE USE OF FORCE AND THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
The gravest danger to freedom lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology-when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to See also comments by Ambos, supra note 69 at 489 and Kemp, supra note 62 at 236. blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends-and we will oppose them with all our power.
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This article concludes with a sobering prediction: it is the opinion of the authors that the present legal concepts on the use of military force, the jus ad bellum, have become relatively anachronistic, if not partially outdated 20 th century concepts which will not suffice when dealing with the present security threats and challenges of the 21 st century. The above quote from the National Security Strategy of 2002 was designed to authorize former US president George Bush's Administration to take pre-emptive action whenever the "United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather" 86 and meant to counter threats involving the use of WMDs 87 by rogue states and armed terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. The emergence of new threats makes an extension of this doctrine not unlikely.
Hybrid attack scenarios (combining a multitude of low intensity and even "virtual" threats), 88 non-state threats in the developing world including asymmetric war scenarios (from international terrorism to piracy) new fifth dimensional threats such as cyber warfare, and finally frequent humanitarian intervention scenarios (albeit under a different name) in response to human rights disasters at a massive scale (caused by environmental and political/religious forces) will significantly influence the way we perceive present concepts and doctrines of the legality of the use of military force in contemporary politics and question our traditional focus on state aggression as a condition for the exercise of self-defence in terms of Article 51 United Nations Charter.
89
To highlight some of these future threats to international peace and security we would like to use the example of cyber war in a so called "Hybrid Threats" scenario. Cyber War 90 basically refers to a sustained computer-based cyber-attack by a state (or non-state actor) against the IT -infrastructure of a target state: an example of such hostile action taking place in the fifth dimension of warfare is the 2007 Russian attempt to virtually block out Estonia's internet infrastructure as a unilateral countermeasure and retribution for Estonia's removal of a WW II Soviet Weapons of mass destruction, refers to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
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The author Bachmann is part of NATO's hybrid threat study group which met in 2011 in Tallinn, Estonia and Brussels, Belgium for a workshop meetings on these new type of threats, see supra note 10. His work focuses on the complementarity of "kinetic" and alternative forms of deterrence for aiders and abettors of international terrorism in a hybrid threat context discussing the impact and effect of "lethal" and "non-lethal" responses, see e.g. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, "Terrorism Litigation As Deterrence Under International Law -From Protecting Human Rights to Countering Hybrid Threats" (2011) 87 Amicus Curiae 22 and also "Hybrid Threats, cyber warfare and NATO's comprehensive approach for countering 21 st century threats -mapping the new frontier of global risk and security management" (2012) 88 Amicus Curiae 14. War Memorial from the centre of Tallinn. 91 Governmental and party websites as well as businesses were severely hampered by this incident of cyber warfare. This incident of using cyber assets was followed by the employment of such cyber measures in connection with the Russian military campaign in Georgia in 2008. The most recent report on the use of a sophisticated use of a virus/worm to sabotage Iran's nuclear weapons programmes, called Stuxnet, by presumably Israel, has highlighted both the technical advancement, possibilities as well as potential of such new means of conducting hostile actions in the fifth dimension of warfare. 92 The continuing and intensifying employment of such cyber-attacks by China against the USA, NATO, the European Union and the rest of the world has led the USA to respond by establishing a central Cyber War Command, the United States Cyber Command [USCYBERCOM] in 2010 93 to "conduct full-spectrum military cyberspace operations in order to enable actions in all domains, ensure US/Allied freedom of action in cyberspace and deny the same to our adversaries."
94 Following these developments and -perhaps supplementing the work of USCYBERCOM -NATO set up a special hybrid threat study group which is studying possible responses to such threats, the so called NATO Transnet network on Countering Hybrid Threats [CHT] . 95 The repercussions for international lawyers in terms of possible responses to such challenges are significant and have not yet been discussed in terms of their full possible impact for the way we define war and peace within the concept of armed attack and individual and collective self-defence in terms of Articles 51, 2 (4) United Nations Charter, Article 5 NATO Treaty etc.
The authors are convinced that the definitions of the nature of an armed attack will change even further than already witnessed in the aftermath of 9/11 96 and will eventually give rise to a significant change in the present body of international law regulating the jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 97 Referring to and reflecting on the 
Ibid.
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See supra note 10.
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See above for the 9/12 UN SC Res which qualified the terrorist attacks as armed attack thus "authorising" the use of military force among other means. Dec. 7, 1978. 98 The White House, supra note 85 at 15. other Hybrid Threats) directed against "hostile" (aka enemy infrastructure), as well as individual high profile targets of both state and non-state actor quality.
Linked to this observation is a cultural dimension which may see the development of a legal perception which differs from the existing, mostly western, historically founded view on the question on the legality of the use of force. The 21 st century will be the century of new global players (with China and India as reemerged global powers) exercising their own brand of economic and military might: their cultural and strategic outlook and understanding on the discussed concepts will determine the fate of the present state of affairs: whether our Western shaped concepts of peace and security and the legacy of Nuremberg will prevail.
The above mentioned "Jasmine" revolution will have far reaching consequences for the Maghreb region as such: whether the "Arab spring" will herald the advent of democracy, peace and stability in the region has to be seen. While these events have not led to a -much feared -strengthening of the most violent and radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda, other fundamental non secular Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria as well as Al-Nahda in Tunisia have significantly gained in terms of public support. The on-going detente between Hamas in Gaza and Al Fatah in the West Bank is a direct consequence of these events and may impact the future of PalestinianIsraeli affairs. The Palestinian -Israeli conflict will see a new phase where the West's open support for the Arab spring will dictate new "rules of engagement" when dealing with Palestinian rights and positions: new expectations have been created with the potential of possible violent conflict scenarios arising from disappointment as well as from the re-emergence of suppressed ethnic and religious rivalries within the region.
Concluding, one can observe that Hybrid Threats, low threshold regional conflicts, as well as asymmetric conflict scenarios which have little in common with traditional 20th century warfare, will be more frequent in this century and will require means and ways of "flexible responsiveness" through escalating levels of confrontation and assets deployed. Future military roles and operations taking place in so called "steady state" environment conflict scenarios will be more flexible in terms of choice of military assets and objectives, but also more frequent. The present concepts of "crisis management" responses will develop further into more pronounced military roles and responsibilities of a more "dynamic" nature. One potential casualty of these new threats might be the infant definition of aggression as adopted at the Kampala Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Kampala definition (which might not even ever enter into force because of a lack of ratifications) is, all legal and political matters considered, as good a definition as can be expected for the complex crime of aggression. However, in a very real sense the Kampala Definition is also a snapshot of the politico-legal realities of the 20 th century. By not providing for non-state actors in the list of acts of aggression, the Kampala Definition will be at the mercy of new and Hybrid Threats to peace and security. To the extent that the Kampala Definition can be viewed as a culmination (or confirmation) of the legacy of Nuremberg, the inherent weakness with respect to new and Hybrid Threats might be the 21 st century equivalent of the international and domestic legal apathy and inaction that threatened and undermined the socalled legacy of Nuremberg.
